2006 CHELTENHAM FESTIVAL REPORT
Published: Monday 24 Jul 2006
NATIONAL HUNT FESTIVAL (CHELTENHAM) EQUINE FATALITIES 2006
INTRODUCTION
Sadly, nine* horses were fatally injured during the 2006 Cheltenham Festival. These fatalities represented a rate of 1.86% of runners compared to the nationwide National Hunt average of 0.50% (and Cheltenham’s non-festival 10-year average of 0.33%), generating a great deal of public and industry wide concern and discussion. The aim of this report, compiled by the HRA’s Racecourse Department, is to firstly establish whether any particular identifiable and resolvable circumstances contributed to the high number of equine fatalities and secondly to make recommendations that could minimise the likelihood of a similar recurrence in future years.
METHOD/EVIDENCE
Feedback and reports have been requested and gathered from a wide range of sources:
• All video footage of each of the fatalities was examined by two well-known ex-professional National Hunt jockeys (Richard Dunwoody and Richard Linley);
• Reports on weather conditions, track maintenance, drainage plans and obstacle preparation details were received from the Cheltenham Racecourse Executive;
• The National Trainers Federation (NTF) and Jockeys Association of Great Britain (JAGB) provided submissions on behalf of their membership;
• Post-mortem reports were received from the Cheltenham racecourse’s Senior Veterinary Surgeon;
• Statistical data was compiled by HRA’s Veterinary and Racecourse Departments;
• HRA’s Senior Inspector of Courses raceday reports were considered;
• Feedback was requested from the trainers of the equine fatalities;
• Discussions were held with the RSPCA.
* Subsequently, two further horses have been put down as a result of injuries sustained at the Festival – Alfred the Great and Kalmini. The statistics the HRA collates on all racecourse equine injuries and fatalities are based on reports from the Racecourse Veterinary Surgeons, and not on information received subsequent to a race meeting. Accordingly, and in order to ensure consistency with all our statistics in this area, the two fatalities that occurred following the completion of the meeting are not counted in the statistical analysis.
EXECUTIVE CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Horseracing Regulatory Authority is satisfied that no single factor, or indeed specific combination of factors, can be categorically blamed for the nine equine fatalities at the 2006 Cheltenham Festival.
From the analysis of detailed research coupled with the submissions from key parties, the following facts were established:
• The Senior HRA Inspector of Courses walked the course at least once every day and agreed the going was no quicker than Good on all 4 days;
• Participant (JAGB/NTF) feedback does not indicate that the condition of the ground was a key factor;
• Contrary to popular belief, Cheltenham’s site does not appear at all “over-drained” – much of the track has no installed drains whatsoever;
• From expert video analysis there were no clear visual common denominators involved (e.g. track location, distractions, rider error, obvious bunching, “no hopers” in the way);
• There had been no equine fatalities at any of Cheltenham’s 2005/06 Season fixtures prior to the Festival;
• The horses concerned had all run at least three times in the past 12 months;
• Most had run at least 15 times in their career;
• None of the handicap race fatalities was out of the handicap;
• Only 1 of the fatalities had previously recorded a racecourse-sustained injury (bruised elbow);
• 7 of the fatalities were on the relatively lightly used New Course (but historically there is very little injury rate difference between the Old and New courses);
• The 2006 Festival faller rates were higher than average, but not unusually so;
• The Course Executive confirmed all obstacles were prepared as normal;
• A large number (seven) of “Pattern” fixtures across the country were lost as a result of the cold, dry Winter 2005/6. This was the most since the severe Winter of 1995/96 when the 1996 Festival saw an out-of-the-ordinary 10 equine fatalities.
• Just one of the nine fatal injuries occurred in a race run in a time faster than the “standard” (County Hurdle).
In light of all the research and evaluation it is impossible to pin down conclusive reasons for such a high number of fatalities, and it is therefore difficult to suggest specific changes. However, acting consistently with our safety and welfare policy of seeking to ensure that the inherent risks associated with horse racing can be minimised or managed as much as possible, a number of recommendations have been identified. These are as follows:
1. For all horses taking part at the Cheltenham Festival from 2007 onwards, a pre-race routine veterinary review (to be carried out by the HRA Veterinary Department) will be implemented by the HRA. The requirement for such a review can be justified by the uniquely intense and competitive nature of the 4 day Festival – Jump racing’s equine Olympics. Cheltenham’s long-term Festival equine fatality rate is just over twice the nationwide average. Cheltenham’s Festival faller rates are also higher than its non-Festival equivalents. Additionally, the Cheltenham Executive and the HRA are to review the feasibility of pre-race veterinary inspections for all Cheltenham Festival runners.
2. The Cheltenham Executive to review the distance and horse/rider eligibility conditions of the NH Chase Challenge Cup with the BHB Racing Department, and the Safety Factor (maximum field size) of the race with HRA Inspectorate, with a recommendation that the conditions revert to those in place prior to 2002. They are to report the findings of this review to the HRA. This recommendation is in light of there having been seven equine fatalities in this race since the changes in the Conditions in 2002 and no fatalities between 1996 and 2000. All 3 of the Chase fatalities at this year’s meeting were in this race.
3. HRA Inspectorate to review with the Cheltenham Executive all Safety Factors specifically for the Festival meeting and report back their findings to the HRA. Whilst it is true that all nine fatalities were in races of 20+ runners, the sample size is small, and the Inspectorate should report back to the HRA Racecourse Department having liaised closely with HRA’s Veterinary Department, whose research in this area is ongoing.
4. HRA Inspectorate and Cheltenham Executive to consider whether to aim for ground officially easier than the regulatory requirement of Good in future and report back their findings to the HRA. Clearly this is not straightforward in the context of March weather and the risk of creating extreme ground, but statistical evidence is clear that the risk of injury increases on quicker going. Cheltenham Executive to also review New Course usage profile with HRA Inspectorate.
5. A review of the approach/siting of fences 14 (Old Course) and 14, 15 (New Course) to be carried out by the Cheltenham Executive and the HRA Inspectorate and the findings of the review reported back to the HRA. These fences accounted for nearly half of all Chase falls and unseated riders at this year’s Festival.
6. The Cheltenham Executive to review the take off and landing maintenance programmes to identify if they can be enhanced at certain obstacles, and report their findings back to the HRA. This recommendation is not a criticism of existing programmes and is in the context of a particularly difficult winter this year.
7. The Cheltenham Executive and HRA Inspectorate to establish whether more racing ground can be utilised through management of fence widths, and report their findings back to the HRA. This recommendation is in the context of a major track widening project having been carried out in 2004 to enable fresh ground to be provided on virtually every day of the meeting.
CONTENTS
1. The Incidents/ The Horses
2. Ground and Obstacles
2.1 Feedback on Ground/Going
2.2 Obstacle Factors
3. Old Course/New Course Track Analysis
4. General Fatality Rate at the Cheltenham Festival
5. Specific Festival Race Factors
6. History of the National Hunt Chase Challenge Cup
7. Comparison of Amateur vs Non Amateur races at the Festival
8. Field sizes
8.1 Hurdle Races
8.2 Steeplechases
9. Overall Recommendations
Cheltenham Fatalities Report Festival 2006
1. The Incidents / The Horses
The starting point for investigating the high number of equine fatalities at this year’s Festival was a review of the visual evidence surrounding the injuries and a “racing analysis” of the horses involved.
All videos of the incidents were reviewed by Ex-professional riders Richard Linley (Senior HRA Inspector of Courses) and Richard Dunwoody:
• There were no clear visual common denominators e.g. location on track/distractions/rider error/bunching/”no hopers” getting in the way.
• Both Bayard (fell 3 out) and Olaso seemed to land very awkwardly at a hurdle in their races (latter continued until PU 2 hurdles later).
• Two of the fatalities, Millenaire and No Where to Hyde, were kicked or hit hard by other runners after their fall.
• Three of the fatalities Basilea Star, Millenaire, Buck Whaley fell with their head/neck twisted awkwardly beneath them.
• Six of the fatalities looked to be getting tired with the incidents occurring towards the end of the race.
• No indication from previous runs that any of the horses were persistent fallers (only three falls from 116 cumulative runs).
In terms of the races in question and the horses’ profiles:
• None of the fatalities occurred in the first two races of the day.
• All the fatalities occurred in fields of 20+ runners.
• Only Buck Whaley’s incident occurred in a race run faster than the “standard”.
• Five of the fatalities occurred in Conditions races on the New course (World Hurdle and NH Chase) and carried weights of 11st 10lb to 12st.
• The majority of the horses were rated 133-143 and none less than 119. None of the handicap fatalities was out of the handicap.
• Only one of the fatalities had previously recorded a racecourse-sustained injury (bruised elbow).
• Feedback received from the trainers does not pinpoint any previous major injury issues.
• Three of the fatalities were trained by Jonjo O’Neill; two by Willie Mullins.
• Seven of the fatalities were on the New Course (but historically there is little injury rate difference between the Old and New Courses).
• Six of the fatalities were hurdlers (there were no hurdle fatalities at the 2005 festival). This figure is nearly five times the 2005 national average, but the sample size is too small to say whether this is statistically significant.
• None of the hurdle races in question exhibit an out of the ordinary fatality rate in the past 10 years.
• Five of the fatalities were due to leg fractures – Cheltenham’s Senior Racecourse Vet believes the horses in question would be “quite likely to have had previous stress fractures in these bones causing transient lameness or poor action and then improve to train on”.
• All fatalities had at least seven career runs; the majority 15+.
• All had run at least three times in the past 12 months and none within 16 days of the Festival.
2. Ground and Obstacles
2.1 Feedback on Ground/Going
• JAGB/NTF feedback does not indicate that the condition of the ground was a key factor in fatalities.
• The JAGB’s view was that the “racecourse team took all appropriate measures”.
• The NTF’s general view was that the ground was “good and safe” and that the fatalities were due to “bad luck” and the “competitiveness of the races”. Some trainers noted “lack of grass growth” in places, albeit accepting that difficult weather conditions contributed to this, and wondered if this affected certain take-offs/loadings.
• Local Met Office observations indicate that 2005/06 Winter was the coldest in the area for 20 years.
• Cheltenham’s Clerk of the Course has confirmed that, as a result, grass growth was unavoidably inhibited this year.
• Cheltenham was forecast substantially more than the 9.6mm of rain it received in the week up to Friday 10th March. Furthermore, 8-13mm was predicted in the period 11th-14th March and consequently no watering took place that weekend. Ultimately only 3mm arrived on the Tuesday (first race day). That said, the going, as planned, was still just on the easy side of Good that day.
• Cheltenham increased its racing width in 2004 and for the last two years there has been more flexibility to use fresh ground at the Festival on both courses.
• Six of the fatalities were on the first day (virgin ground) that the New Course was used.
• The possibility of having a clearer run-up in months leading to the festival has been discussed between the Cheltenham Clerk of the Course, Simon Claisse and the HRA Senior Inspector of Courses, but the late January fixture was abandoned this year anyway so was not a factor.
• The Cheltenham Executive has provided detailed track drainage plans which, in HRA Inspectorate’s opinion and combined with their experience of the venue, refute the suggestion that the site is “over drained”.
• The Racecourse’s Senior Racecourse Vet reported particularly low tendon strain injuries for the four days – just one, which was an old injury. This does not indicate fast ground conditions.
• There was no clear clustering of injury location on the tracks to indicate any particular “hotspot” of e.g. bad/false ground.
• It is interesting to note that the number of high profile “pattern race” meetings lost across the country due to weather Winter 2005/06 (seven) was the most since the harsh Winter of 1996, where there were 10 Fatalities at that year’s Festival.
• There had been no equine fatalities at any of Cheltenham’s 2005/06 season fixtures prior to the Festival.
• The Senior HRA Inspector of Courses walked the course at least once every day and agreed the going was no quicker than Good on all 4 days. A representative from the RSPCA walked the course and had no adverse comments about the state of the going.
Ground Recommendations for Course Executive/ HRA Inspectorate investigation:
1. Consider whether to aim for ground officially easier than the current regulatory requirement of “Good” in future – albeit not straightforward in the context of March weather and the risk of creating extreme ground.
2. Review New Course usage profile.
3. Review take off/landing maintenance programmes to identify if they can be enhanced at certain obstacles (in the context of particularly difficult winter this year).
4. Establish whether more racing ground can be utilised through management of fence widths.
2.2 Obstacle Factors
2.2.1 Steeple Chase Faller Rates
There were 32 steeplechase fallers/UR’S at the 2006 Festival. Three of the fallen horses were fatally injured, one horse sustained a long term injury and one horse sustained a short term injury.
The Fence faller rate of 9.1% was above the long term average for the festival of 7.8% although not abnormally high for the Festival.
The All Faller Rate of 15.5% (this includes Slip Ups, Brought Downs & Unseated Riders) is slightly above the long term festival average of 13.1%.
2.2.2 Hurdle Race Faller Rates
There were 12 hurdle race fallers at the Festival. Four of the fallen horses were fatally injured, one horse sustained a short term injury.
The Hurdle faller rate of 3.2% was slightly above the long term average for the festival of 3.1%.
The All Faller Rate of 5.5% (this includes Slip Ups, Brought Downs & Unseated Riders) was slightly above the long term Festival average of 4.7%.
At a subsequent HRA meeting with the RSPCA, the latter stated that they would like to see all hurdles of the “bracketed variety” – i.e. an approved construction of hurdles where the protruding (but still padded) uprights are slightly reduced by 2 – 2 ½ inches (to about 1 – 1 ½ inches). This is achieved by sitting the top horizontal bar of the hurdle in a bracket rather than it being morticed directly into the upright.
Cheltenham currently has 2 such flights whilst 2 courses throughout the country have all bracketed hurdles. There was no inference from the RSPCA that the lack of bracketed hurdles was a contributory factor to any of the hurdles fatalities at this year’s Festival.
2.2.3 Cross Country Race Faller rate
There were 2 fallers on the cross country course, no equine injuries were sustained.
CONCLUSION:
• The 2006 Festival Faller rates for both chasing and hurdling were higher than the Cheltenham Festival average, but not abnormally so.
• The Senior HRA Inspector of Courses does not believe there are any significant differences to the obstacles when compared to recent Festivals, and the Course Executive has confirmed they were prepared as normal.
2.2.4 Any Trends to Fence Fallers
On the Old Course Fence 14 (“2nd last”) was clearly the site of most falls and unseated riders at the Festival in 2006. This is in line with its statistical ranking as the most difficult fence on the course over the past 2 years.
On the New Course Fence 14 (“4th last”) and Fence 15 (“3rd last”) suffered the most falls and unseated riders at the Festival in 2006. Again this is in line with their statistical ranking as clearly the most difficult fences on the course over the past 2 years.
The 3 steeplechase fatalities all occurred after falls in the same race on the New Course. However, they occurred at 3 different unrelated fences.
2.2.5 Fatalities Location on Course
The chase fatalities were random in terms of location, at individual fence numbers five, 12 and 14.
Four of the six hurdle fatalities were in the region of the fourth last flight to last flight of hurdles in their respective races.
The other two hurdlers Sh Boom (UR 5th flight New Course), Olaso (on flat after 5th flight New Course) and Millenaire (5th Fence New Course) all remaining fatalities were in the latter stages of their respective races.
2.2.6 Rider Issues at Obstacles
There is nothing to suggest that major rider error in terms of presentation at an obstacle was a factor.
2.2.7 Outside Distractions at Obstacles – Public Proximity/Ground Staff/Fence Attendants/Cameramen
There did not appear to be any contributing factors relating to the above groups, and even No Where to Hyde, the only fatality at a last fence or hurdle and who was not crowded at the last hurdle, was shielded by other runners from being distracted by any of the groups.
Only Mr Babbage was commented on by the former jockeys in particular terms of tiredness. It is fair to assume that other runners (Fences – Basilea Star, 4th last; Hurdles – Bayard, 3rd last, No Where to Hyde last, Holy Orders 4th last, Buck Whaley 2nd last), were getting tired albeit holding their position in the race at the time of their fall or fatal injury.
Obstacle recommendations for Course Executive/HRA Inspectorate investigation:
• Review approach/siting of the fences specified in 2.2.4 above.
3. Old Course / New Course Track Analysis
Old and New Courses
At the 2006 Festival 7 of the 9 fatalities occurred on the 3rd and 4th days when all races were run over the NEW course.
Historically there is little difference in the fatality rates between the OLD and NEW courses for either hurdle or steeplechase races.
CONCLUSION:
There is ordinarily little difference in the fatality rates between the OLD and NEW courses
4. General Fatality Rate at the Cheltenham Festival
The rolling 10 year average for fatalities at the Festival this has steadily decreased to 1.07% in the 10 calendar years to 2006, even including this year’s nine fatalities. This decrease in the fatality rate is in line with a steady decrease in the national fatality rate which currently stands at 0.50% in the 10 calendar years to 2006.
CONCLUSION:
The unique demands of the Cheltenham Festival create an increased risk for horses.
5. Specific Festival Race Factors
The 2006 Festival Races which incurred Fatalities
At the 2006 Festival six races (five hurdle & one chase) featured animals that were fatally injured. Of the five hurdle races none had had a significantly high percentage of fatalities during the previous 10 years. The NH Steeple Chase Challenge Cup run on Thursday, however, had suffered 4 fatalities between 2002 and 2005.
CONCLUSION:
Of the races that featured fatalities in 2006 only the 4m 1f NH Steeplechase had a previous history of multiple fatalities.
6. Equine Fatality History of the 4m 1f NH Steeplechase for Amateur Riders
Between 1996 and 2006 there have been 7 fatalities in this race. It may be significant that there were no fatalities during 1996 to 2000 and that all 7 fatalities occurred after the conditions were changed in 2002 (no meeting in 2001) from a Amateur Riders Maiden Chase (a maiden at the start of that season) to an Amateur Riders Novices Chase. This effectively meant that horses that won prior to the current season were now eligible to run as long as they were qualified as Novice Chasers.
There were three equine fatalities in this race this year – markedly above the Festival/nationwide chase average, and the only chase fatalities over the 4 days.
CONCLUSION:
This race now has a record of seven fatalities in 10 years (all since the conditions were changed), significantly above the national or Festival average.
7. Comparison of Amateur vs Non Amateur Races at Cheltenham in general and at the Festival in Particular.
Statistics, in terms of fallers at Cheltenham show that whether they are ridden by amateurs or not appears to have little impact on rates. However, there is an overall increase in fallers between Cheltenham non-Festival and Festival from 6 per cent to 8 per cent. This increase is virtually the same for Professionals and Amateurs alike.
However, the figures show that the 2000-2005 fatality rate of horses ridden by Amateurs at Cheltenham is much higher than those ridden by Professionals, and this is almost entirely down to the NH Steeplechase.
Recommendation:
In the context of Paras 6 and 7 above (and Paras 8.2 and 9 below), the Course Executive should review distance and horse/rider eligibility conditions of NH Chase Challenge Cup with BHB Racing Department, and the Safety Factor of the race with HRA Inspectorate.
8. Field Sizes
8.1Hurdle Races
In general, the overall Cheltenham 2000 – 2005 hurdle fatality rate increases between field sizes of 24 and 30.
8.2 Steeplechases
In terms of field sizes versus fatalities, at the Festival the figures for 2000-2005 show an apparent general increase in fatality rate when the number of runners reaches 20.
With reference to the Cheltenham Festival specifically, steeplechase and hurdle fatalities peak when the number of runners is at 26.
Although there has been one round of Safety Factor reductions in 2003 the HRA Inspectorate and Cheltenham Executive should consider reducing the Safety Factors further.
Recommendation:
HRA Inspectorate to review all Safety Factors for the Festival with the Cheltenham Executive.
9. Overall Recommendations
1. For all horses taking part at the Cheltenham Festival from 2007 onwards, a pre-race routine veterinary review (to be carried out by the HRA Veterinary Department) will be implemented by HRA. The requirement for such a review can be justified by the uniquely intense and competitive nature of the 4 day Festival – Jump racing’s equine Olympics. Cheltenham’s long-term Festival equine fatality rate is just over twice the nationwide average. Cheltenham’s Festival faller rates are also higher than its non-Festival equivalents. Additionally, the Cheltenham Executive and the HRA are to review the feasibility of pre-race veterinary inspections for all Cheltenham Festival runners.
2. The Cheltenham Executive to review the distance and horse/rider eligibility conditions of the NH Chase Challenge Cup with the BHB Racing Department, and the Safety Factor (maximum field size) of the race with HRA Inspectorate, with a recommendation that the conditions revert to those in place prior to 2002. They are to report the findings of this review to the HRA. This recommendation is in light of there having been seven equine fatalities in this race since the changes in the Conditions in 2002 and no fatalities between 1996 and 2000. All 3 of the Chase fatalities at this year’s meeting were in this race.
3. HRA Inspectorate to review with the Cheltenham Executive all Safety Factors specifically for the Festival meeting and report back their findings to the HRA. Whilst it is true that all nine fatalities were in races of 20+ runners, the sample size is small, and the Inspectorate should report back to the HRA Racecourse Department having liaised closely with HRA’s Veterinary Department, whose research in this area is ongoing.
4. HRA Inspectorate and Cheltenham Executive to consider whether to aim for ground officially easier than the regulatory requirement of Good in future and report back their findings to the HRA. Clearly this is not straightforward in the context of March weather and the risk of creating extreme ground, but statistical evidence is clear that the risk of injury increases on quicker going. Cheltenham Executive to also review New Course usage profile with HRA Inspectorate.
5. A review of the approach/siting of fences 14 (Old Course) and 14, 15 (New Course) to be carried out by the Cheltenham Executive and the HRA Inspectorate and the findings of the review reported back to the HRA. These fences accounted for nearly half of all Chase falls and unseated riders at this year’s Festival.
6. The Cheltenham Executive to review the take off and landing maintenance programmes to identify if they can be enhanced at certain obstacles, and report their findings back to the HRA. This recommendation is not a criticism of existing programmes and is in the context of a particularly difficult winter this year.
7. The Cheltenham Executive and HRA Inspectorate to establish whether more racing ground can be utilised through management of fence widths, and report their findings back to the HRA. This recommendation is in the context of a major track widening project having been carried out in 2004 to enable fresh ground to be provided on virtually every day of the meeting.