Appeal Board decision
1. On 13 May 2014, the Appeal Board of the British Horseracing Authority (BHA) heard an Appeal by the trainer Alan Jarvis (“the Appellant”) against the decision of the Licensing Committee dated 9 April 2014 to refuse him a trainer’s licence for the period 1 February 2014 to 31 January 2015 on the ground that he is not a suitable person to hold such a licence.
2. The grounds of Appeal were:
(1) that the reasons given are insufficient to support the decision;
(2) that there was insufficient material on the basis of which a reasonable decision maker could have made the decision in question;
(3) that the Committee misconstrued, failed to apply or wrongly applied the Rules and Guidance applicable to its decision;
(4) that there is evidence available for the Appeal which, had it been available at the original hearings, would or should have caused the decision maker to reach a materially different decision.
3. The Appeal was dismissed.
4. The matter of costs was adjourned.
5. A temporary licence has been granted for two weeks’ duration from 13 May 2014. The licence will expire on 27 May 2014.
The licence is granted subject to the following condition:
(1) The Appellant can only make entries, for all categories of race, if those entries are made between the date hereof and close of business on Monday 19 May 2014.
6. Both the BHA and the Appellant conveyed through Counsel that, in accordance with Paragraph 35 of Schedule (A)7 of the Rules of Racing, they will inform the Appeal Board within 5 days whether or not they require written Reasons for its decision.
Following discussion with Counsel, the Appeal Board elected to record how one conclusion would be imported into its written Reasons if they were required. This centres upon the phrase “serious commercial immorality” which appears in paragraph 51 of the Reasons of the Licensing Committee. This has not only been the subject of much forensic argument but has, it is clear, caused the Appellant offence and distress, he perceiving that the word “immorality” connotes something more culpable than irresponsibility or lack of integrity. The conclusion of the Appeal Board is that for the words “commercial immorality” an appropriate substitute turn of phrase would have been “commercial lack of integrity”.
The Board for the hearing was: Bruce Blair QC (Chairman), Lord Rathcreeden and Charles Warde-Aldam
Licensing Committee reasons
Before the Licensing Committee of the British Horsreacing Authority re: Peter Alan Jarvis
Application for a Trainer’s Licence 1 February 2014 – 31 January 2015
Hearing Dates: 17 January and 25 March 2014
Committee Members: Sebastian Prentis (Chairman), Richard Russell and Edward Dorrell
1 Mr Alan Jarvis was first granted a licence to train in 1968. Save for a period between 1988 and 1991, when he was disqualified, he has held one ever since. Racing has been his life’s work.
2 On 13 November 2013 Ms Annette Baker, Licensing Team Leader at the British Horseracing Authority (the “BHA”), wrote to Mr Jarvis to inform him that the BHA considered that he was no longer a suitable person to continue to hold a licence, and had therefore made a reference to this Committee for determination of whether Mr Jarvis’s current licence, valid until 31 January 2014, should be withdrawn (the “Letter”). The BHA summarised its concerns, detailed in the Letter, as follows.
“It is evident that you have not always been open and honest with counterparties and the BHA. You have continually failed to disclose matters that are of relevance, and have been misleading in the declarations you have made in your applications for renewal. Your recent dealings with DBS [Doncaster Bloodstock Sales Limited] are indicative of a general pattern throughout your career of failing to pay debts owed and not being open and honest about your assets. The BHA is of the opinion that your record of financial impropriety and your conduct when dealing with other members of the racing community are sufficiently serious that you are no longer suitable to hold a Trainer’s Licence. You have shown a disregard throughout your licensed career for those you have entered into business with and have failed to conduct yourself with the openness, honesty and integrity that the sport demands.”
3 The original meeting date of 11 December 2013 was postponed to permit Mr Jarvis adequate time to prepare his response. The Committee therefore met Mr Jarvis on 17 January 2014. After a full day that meeting was adjourned, not least to permit Mr Jarvis to submit further evidence. As 1 February 2014 brought with it a new licensing year the Committee issued Mr Jarvis with a temporary licence until 28 March 2014 or, as occurred, the earlier resumption date; and with the agreement of the BHA and of Mr Jarvis it directed that at the resumed hearing the application would be treated as though it were an objection by the BHA to the renewal of Mr Jarvis’s licence for the period 1 February 2014 to 31 January 2015.
4 The further hearing was held on 25 March 2014. At its conclusion the Committee informed Mr Jarvis that it refused his application for a renewal of his licence, for reasons which it would put into writing. These are those reasons.
Mr Jarvis’s history
5 There is no disputing the competence of Mr Jarvis as a trainer. Between 1 January 1988 and 11 November 2013 he had 5,187 runners, of which 407 won and 1,515 were placed, generating prize money of £3,641,785.
6 In his financial dealings he has been less successful.
6.1 He was first bankrupted on 3 September 1987.
6.2 On 7 May 2003 he entered an individual voluntary arrangement (“IVA”) by which he paid his creditors, including DBS, 20 pence in the pound over 5 years.
6.3 On 5 September 2013 he was bankrupted again, this time by DBS, on the debt which forms the central allegation against him at this hearing (the “DBS Debt”) (the “Bankruptcy Order”). We will return to the details of the DBS Debt below. The bankruptcy petition was presented to the Court on 11 July 2013 and thereafter served on Mr Jarvis; it was in the sum of £868,366, and based on a statutory demand served on 13 June 2013; and the statutory demand was itself founded on the summary judgment which DBS obtained against Mr Jarvis on 16 June 2010. It should also be noted that Mr Jarvis’s wife, Margaret Ann, was made bankrupt on the same day, though in her case that was following the failure of her IVA, entered into in October 2010. Mrs Jarvis was jointly and severally liable for the DBS Debt such that it was the major creditor in her IVA, albeit that its application for summary judgment against her had failed.
7 Mr Jarvis has also trained for two companies owned or controlled by Mrs Jarvis which have entered insolvency procedures.
7.1 Between 2003 and 2007 he trained for APJ Bloodstock Limited (“APJ Bloodstock”), a company incorporated on 19 December 2002. A winding-up petition was apparently presented against it on 27 April 2007; it entered administration on 30 July 2007 with debts of some £727,318 (more than £500,000 being owed to Mrs Jarvis once she had paid the bank on her guarantee); and it was dissolved on 28 January 2009.
7.2 Between 2007 and 2011 Mr Jarvis trained for Advanced Consultants Limited (“ACL”). It was incorporated on 18 May 2007; had a winding-up petition presented against it on 6 September 2011, and was wound up on that petition on 7 November 2011.
8 The Letter attaches as its Annex C a list of judgment debts against Mr Jarvis and APJ Bloodstock. Excluding the DBS Debt and the two APJ Bloodstock debts these comprise ten judgments stretching between 1992 and 1998.
9 At its Annex B the Letter also identifies a number of complaints made directly to the BHA or the Jockey Club concerning Mr Jarvis’s failure to pay debts. Again, excluding the DBS Debt, these are all of some antiquity.
10 It was the earlier bankruptcy order and creditor complaints which led to Mr Jarvis’s four previous attendances before this Committee.
10.1 At the hearing on 7 February 1985 the Committee told Mr Jarvis that
“…it was unusual for them to receive so many letters of complaint from different people concerning the conduct of a Licensed Trainer, and it also appeared from the Equestrian Trade News publication that he was the subject of a far higher number of court orders than any other Licensed Trainer. Such a situation was not in the best interests of racing, and the Committee warned him that unless his conduct improved, and his continual involvement in court judgments and litigation ceased, his position as a Public Trainer would have to be reconsidered.”
10.2 The note of that hearing records that the Committee “accepted [Mr Jarvis’s] assurances that he was now financially sound…”. As above, he was bankrupted on 3 September 1987.
10.3 At the expiry of his disqualification period (a disqualification which Mr Jarvis says was on an erroneous basis) he attended the Committee again on 12 June 1991. It is apparent that one of the debts due in Mr Jarvis’s earlier bankruptcy was to DBS, because the Committee observed that it would be helpful to his application for a new licence if that debt, and two others, were paid. The record of this meeting shows that it too was concerned with Mr Jarvis’s financial state.
10.4 Similarly, the 6 April 1994 meeting concerned outstanding debts of Mr Jarvis which had been reported to the Jockey Club. Mr Jarvis’s licence was extended on the condition that his solicitor confirmed by letter that three particular debts were being resolved. One of those was a judgment debt owed to the British Bloodstock Agency plc, which Mr Jarvis told that Committee was not his at all but his daughter’s. Mr Jarvis’s daughter, Mrs Sarah Simmons, attended the adjourned hearing on 25 March 2014 and told the Committee that it was not her debt. Nothing turns on this difference in recollection.
10.5 The Committee was convened again on 5 June 2008 “because of a background of apparently severe financial difficulties” which had led to the administration of APJ Bloodstock. The Committee wanted to satisfy itself that ACL was going to be able to trade solvently. It concluded that it would be able to, and granted Mr Jarvis a licence subject to a number of conditions.
10.6 As above, on 6 September 2011 ACL had presented against it the winding-up petition on which it was subsequently liquidated. This Committee does not have further details of that petition, nor of ACL’s precise financial circumstances on liquidation.
The General Manual and the Guidance Notes
11 By paragraph 3 of Part 1 to Schedule 9 of the General Manual
“An applicant for the grant or renewal of a licence, permit or registration is required to satisfy the Authority that he meets all the criteria contained within the guidance notes which accompany the prescribed form.”
12 The following Guidance Notes are of particular relevance.
“4. Applicants are required to demonstrate or confirm that…
They are otherwise in all the circumstances suitable to hold a licence (i.e. that they are ‘fit and proper’)…
J. General Suitability (‘Fit and Proper’)
26. In considering any application, the BHA must also be satisfied, taking into account any fact or matter that it considers appropriate, that the applicant is suitable to hold a licence. Relevant considerations include the applicant’s honesty and integrity, business competence and capability and financial soundness.
27. In relation to each section below, the BHA expects full and frank disclosure from the applicant, who is required to disclose matters known to him/ her and those which he/ she can be expected to discover by making enquiries. Failure to do so will be a relevant factor in the assessment as to an applicant’s competence, honesty and integrity.
28. A person whose conduct, behaviour or character is not in accordance with that which, in the opinion of the BHA, should be expected of a licensed person, may not be considered suitable and therefore may be refused a licence.
29. In some cases a single factor may lead to the conclusion that someone is not suitable, whereas in another case the determination of whether someone is not suitable may depend upon the cumulative assessment of a number of matters.
30. It is not possible to produce a definitive list of all matters that would be relevant to a particular application. This document should be considered a guide as to the sorts of considerations that the BHA will have in mind when making such an assessment.
Honesty and Integrity
31. The criteria to which the BHA will have regard in assessing honesty and integrity include the following:…
31.3 Whether the applicant has been the subject of any adverse finding by a judge in any civil proceedings, or has settled civil proceedings brought against him/ her relating to any matter which could reasonably be said to materially affect his/ her suitability to hold a licence.
31.4 The applicant’s record of compliance with the regulatory requirements of the BHA or its predecessors…
31.5 Whether the applicant has been candid, open and truthful in all his/ her dealings:
31.5.1 With the BHA in relation to the present or relevant past licence applications…
37. The BHA will take into account the financial track record of an applicant and (whether or not the business is owned by the applicant) all the relevant circumstances in assessing the likely financial soundness of the proposed training business…
38. Relevant factors include:
38.1 Whether the applicant has been the subject of any judgement debt or award in Great Britain or elsewhere, which remains unpaid or was not satisfied within a reasonable period.
38.2 Whether the applicant has ever, in Great Britain or elsewhere, made arrangements with his creditors, filed for bankruptcy, had a bankruptcy petition served on him, been adjudged bankrupt, or been the subject of any other bankruptcy process (including any restrictions order or undertaking or sequestration of assets).
38.3 Whether the applicant has been a director or other officer or shareholder of a company which has gone into insolvent liquidation or has been placed into administration while the applicant was so connected to the company or within 12 months of his/ her ceasing to be so connected.”
The renewal application
13 Mr Jarvis’s application to renew his licence for the period 1 February 2014 to 31 January 2015 is dated 19 December 2013. It is proposed that he continue to train for APJ Horseracing Limited (“APJ Horseracing”), a company incorporated on 21 December 2010 to provide him with continuity of employment after the demise of ACL. Mr Jarvis was originally sole shareholder, and the original director was an accountant, Mr Anthony Wheeler. In July 2012 Mr Jarvis transferred his shareholding to Mrs Simmons, who also became a director. She has been sole director since Mr Wheeler’s appointment terminated in December 2012.
The evidence at the hearings
14 Together with its attachments the Letter comprised nearly 400 pages. Having read it, the Committee requested further details concerning the Doncaster Debt, which seemed to it then, as now, the critical issue in assessing Mr Jarvis’s suitability. Under cover of an e-mail of 7 January 2014 Mr Henry Beeby of DBS provided to the BHA and to Mr Jarvis copies of the statement his father, Mr Harry Beeby, had made in support of DBS’s summary judgment application, and of certain correspondence passing between DBS and Mr and Mrs Jarvis.
15 Shortly before the first hearing Mr Jarvis provided a detailed witness statement addressing all the issues. He provided a further statement and documents prior to the adjourned hearing. The Committee’s questions were directed at the contents of those statements.
16 Mr Jarvis attended both hearings together with his wife. Also present was his financial adviser, Mr Graham Eldred, who was directly involved in some of the events and was otherwise able to assist with his professional knowledge. The Committee’s questions were primarily directed to Mr Jarvis, but on occasion to Mrs Jarvis as well: she had more knowledge and recollection of the management of the business, being in charge of its administration, and had herself put, and lost, considerable sums in it over the years. Both Mr and Mrs Jarvis and Mr Eldred intervened during the hearings to put across a point of view or a recollection.
17 Present at the adjourned hearing was Mrs Simmons. The Committee had some questions for her, and she too intervened when she felt appropriate.
18 At the hearings Mr Jarvis was represented by Mr Roderick Moore, and the BHA by Mr Tim Naylor. The Committee is grateful for the assistance which both counsel gave.
The DBS Debt
19 Mr Jarvis has been dealing with DBS since the 1970s. In that period he has, in DBS’s words, “bought a significant number of horses”, which Mr Jarvis quantified as being worth “many, many millions”.
20 DBS and Mr Jarvis agree that his purchases were of two types. Either Mr Jarvis would buy “on spec”, meaning that he would buy horses in his own name which he would then seek to sell on, or he would act as an agent for purchasers. In the latter situation DBS says that Mr Jarvis’s general practice was to have the invoices made out to himself rather than to his principal.
21 Although nobody has suggested that it matters for our purposes, in respect of some or all of his purchases Mr Jarvis’s liability to DBS was co-extensive with his wife’s: DBS was the major creditor in her IVA, and we assume is so in her ensuing bankruptcy as well; and there is an acknowledgement of debt signed by the Jarvises dated 26 June 2007.
22 DBS was also a major creditor in Mr Jarvis’s successful IVA, which ran for 5 years from 7 May 2003.
23 The immediate history unfolds as follows. By 12 June 2006 Mr Jarvis owed DBS £618,817, mostly in respect of the 2005 St Leger Yearling Sales and the October 2005 Yearling Sales. According to a letter of that date from Harry Beeby to the Jarvises, they had promised to clear the debt “in full by the end of this week at the absolute latest”.
24 That did not occur. On 21 August 2006 Harry Beeby wrote again, referring to the remaining outstanding balance of £421,026 and a further promise to pay such that “hopefully, the balance will be cleared by the end of this week.” He continued:
“I am afraid it goes without saying that this must be cleared in full if further business is to be transacted at the St.Leger Yearling Sales next week and I am sure you will make every conceivable effort to ensure that this is the case as we would obviously like to see you as potential purchasers and, equally, I am certain that you will want to buy at this Sale.
I must, however, make it clear that the Board have instructed me to advise you that we will need to bill clients direct for any purchases which you are able to make and, to that end, would need written instruction in line with the Agent’s Authorisation form, as set out on Page 20 of the Catalogue, as well as an appropriate banker’s reference if unknown to this Company.
I thought it was in everyone’s best interests for me to put things down in writing for you so that we all know how we stand and Henry and I will be at York for the three days and would be happy to meet up with you to discuss things further if required.”
25 The balance was not cleared before the 2006 St Leger Yearling Sales. Instead, Mr Jarvis submitted two Page 20 Authorisation of Agent forms: the first, subject to a limit of 100,000 guineas, was on behalf of Eurostrait Ltd (“Eurostrait”), a company owned or controlled by a long-term client of Mr Jarvis, Mr Bishop; the second, subject to a 60,000 guinea limit, was on behalf of another long-term client, Mr Pope.
26 At the auction Mr Jarvis bid on seven lots totalling £226,058 which were invoiced by DBS to Eurostrait; and two lots totalling £51,334 which were invoiced by DBS to Mr Pope.
27 In its submission to the BHA dated 9 August 2013, DBS says that in respect of Eurostrait, Mr Pope and Hibiscus (the last of which we will address separately below):
“In each case, Mr Jarvis indicated he was acting as agent for one of the parties identified above and asked DBS to invoice purchases to those parties. However those parties subsequently informed DBS that they did not authorise Mr and Mrs Jarvis to purchase these horses on their behalf and therefore the purchases were added to Mr and Mrs Jarvis’ account with their agreement.”
28 It is therefore DBS’s position that, but for the Authorisation of Agent forms, it would not have permitted Mr Jarvis to bid; that it permitted Mr Jarvis to bid only as agent, as evidenced by the invoices; and that in fact Mr Jarvis had no authority from his purported principals at all.
29 Bearing in mind the terms of the 21 August 2006 letter and the subsequent invoices the Committee regards DBS’s position as cogent. However, Mr Moore points out that what neither it nor the evidence in support of the summary judgment addresses explicitly is why, if the Authorisation of Agent forms were limited in amount, that amount was exceeded in respect of Eurostrait. Mr Moore can also point to the DBS running account. The Jarvises questioned whether that account, which is at pages 55-56 of the first bundle, was entirely accurate, but Mr Moore realistically and correctly conceded that, summary judgment having been obtained on it and, it might be added, there being no proposed alternative, the Committee should take it as being accurate (the “Account”). The Account shows receipts of £100,000 on 27 March 2007, which the Jarvises said was in respect of the Eurostrait agency, and £50,000 which the Jarvises said was in respect of Mr Bishop’s agency. The evidence as to the latter was confused, but for present purposes the Committee will assume that what it was told was correct. Those receipts might go some way to counter the notion that there was no agency agreement at all.
30 Mindful of those issues, the Committee therefore intends to address the suitability of Mr Jarvis against the background of his own account as to how the DBS Debt was incurred at the 2006 and 2007 St Leger Yearling Sales.
The 2006 St Leger Yearling Sales
31 Mr Jarvis acknowledges, as he must, that before the 2006 St Leger Yearling Sales he owed DBS a great deal of money, for which it was pressing, and promises for the repayment of which had not been met; and that under the terms of the 21 August letter, he was not going to be allowed to bid at the 2006 St Leger Yearling Sales absent Authorisation of Agent forms. Those forms were submitted and, Mr Jarvis says, meant what they said: he could, and did, only bid up to the amounts stated; and that is why Eurostrait and Mr Bishop in the end paid those amounts (or, at least, something approximating to them).
32 As to the bids in excess of his authorities, Mr Jarvis says that after all this time he cannot recall exactly what happened. However, he says that those bids would not have been attributable to the inadvertence of DBS. Instead, he would have bid for the further horses with someone specific in mind for each of them; he may well have discussed this with the Beebys on the day; and either it was expressly agreed with them, or it was understood because of the general conversations and dealings between them, that Mr Jarvis would not be able to pay for these additional horses until such time as he sold them on. As he said in his initial statement:
“[DBS] therefore knew that I would not have any surplus funds until [my IVA] was completed in 2008 and the liability would therefore have to be settled via third parties acquiring the horses.”
33 Critically, it was Mr Jarvis’s evidence at the first hearing that when the horses were sold on by him, the sale proceeds were paid to DBS. He acknowledged that he himself had no means of paying for them otherwise, a point borne out by Mrs Jarvis’s statement that it was she who had made all the payments under his IVA.
34 However, the Account discloses no payment representing the proceeds of a horse bought at the 2006 (or 2007) St Leger Yearling Sales and subsequently sold on by Mr Jarvis. £100,000, being the Eurostrait payment, was received on 27 March 2007 and appropriated by DBS to the earlier 2005 St Leger Yearling Sales debt. After that, no payments were made to the credit of Mr Jarvis’s account other than the net proceeds of horses sold by Mrs Jarvis through DBS; and the last of these credits was on 2 October 2008.
35 The Committee therefore asked Mr Jarvis to provide it over the adjournment with
“In respect of the 2006 and 2007 St Leger Sales, the identification of all horses bought by you, to whom those horses were sold, how much for, when and what became of the sales proceeds”.
36 Mr Jarvis addressed this in his second statement, which in respect of the 2006 St Leger Yearling Sales also attached a schedule (the “Schedule”). The Schedule describes the payments of £50,000 and £100,000, and then attributes £62,551, being the sale proceeds of lot 255 at the 2007 St Leger Yearling Sales owned by Mrs Jarvis, to the account, leaving a shortfall of £64,840. This the Jarvises said was nearly covered by the value of FACLIYEV, billed to Eurostrait, which had subsequently died.
37 In respect of three of the onward sales the Jarvises attached invoices from Mr Jarvis to the new owner. These sales were all in the first quarter of 2007. The Jarvises were unable to recollect when the other horses had been sold.
38 At the bottom of the Schedule the Jarvises noted this:
“When horses were sold to regular clients this was done at cost with only expenses including any training fees already accrued between the purchase and sale being added. These were paid to the company, who would have raised a bill, by the new owner.”
Two of the three invoices explicitly include expenses.
39 On questioning at the adjourned hearing, Mrs Jarvis acknowledged that lot 255 was not a horse bought at the 2006 St Leger Yearling Sales. Neither were the Jarvises able to identify a single horse bought at the 2006 St Leger Yearling Sales (or indeed the 2007 Sales) which had been sold on by DBS, or themselves, and the proceeds credited to the Account. Indeed, Mrs Jarvis confirmed that even where she was the purchaser of the 2006 or 2007 horses, nothing was paid to DBS. As indicated by the note at the bottom of the Schedule, the sale proceeds of these horses were probably paid back into the business. They did not go to DBS.
40 Mr Jarvis gave two purported explanations for that failure.
41 First, he said that he expected to pay DBS through raising a lump sum. There were, certainly, year after year lump sum offers coming from the Jarvises, none of which in the event generated a penny for DBS (although Mr Jarvis says that they came very close). However, relying on a lump sum is to ignore the actual agreement which Mr Jarvis says was made. It also provides no real explanation when set against the correspondence contemporaneous with the three sale dates Mr Jarvis has identified, which shows DBS chasing its money, however it may be obtained, based on continued representations from the Jarvises that it will be paid.
41.1The first of the sales, for £46,925, appears to have been made shortly after 31 January 2007. On 6 February 2007 Mr Beeby was writing to the Jarvises:
“As I said to you on Friday last, the Board were emphatic that this should be placed in other hands for collection unless payments were made at the start of this week so this is the final chance to clear this account which, as you know, should have been settled many months ago.”
41.2 The next sale was by invoice dated 2 March 2007 for £14,687. On 5 March 2007 Mr Beeby wrote, following receipt of a post-dated cheque which was apparently not met:
“I note from our telephone conversation that you are totally confident that the balance in question- £39,249.25- will be cleared prior to [20 March 2007] and I have to say that this is imperative… I have been asked to make it abundantly clear that there can be no further delays and that legal action will be instituted unless these funds are cleared.”
41.3 The other sale was for £11,750 invoiced on 20 April 2007. On 4 May 2007 Mr Beeby wrote:
“St. Leger Yearling Sales 2006
It was extremely disappointing that you were unable to let me have a cheque to clear this particular account and I confirm that the figure is £139,249.25.
I understand that Mr Morton is coming to see you over the weekend and that you are hopeful of doing business with him to provide funds and I will be in touch with you at the start of next week to clarify the situation.”
42 Thus, despite DBS’s demands and the Jarvises’ promises of payment, when money came into their hands from the sale of the 2006 horses they chose not to pay it to DBS.
43 It must also be recalled that Mr Jarvis did not owe DBS solely for the 2006 St Leger Yearling Sales. At the beginning of 2007 his debt exceeded £400,000 and dated back to the 2005 St Leger Yearling Sales. Payments of sale proceeds of horses bought at the 2006 St Leger Yearling Sales were not going to dent that pre-existing debt, because the sales were to be at cost plus expenses. To that extent, therefore, a further payment was going to be necessary. But the necessity of making that payment does not seem to the Committee to explain the failure to make payment of other monies in accordance with the agreement.
44 Although naturally sympathetic, neither does the Committee consider Mr Jarvis’s second explanation sufficient. This is that following his son’s death in 2004, leaving a young family, and Mrs Simmons’ diagnosis with cancer in 2007 and subsequent sustained battle against it, Mr Jarvis was in a “bad place” and unable to deal with things properly. There is no indication that Mr Jarvis restricted his training activities at this time: indeed, in 2007 ACL was incorporated so that he could carry them on after the demise of APJ Bloodstock. Neither did he restrict his activities at DBS: he bought horses to the value of £522,675 at the 2005 St Leger Yearling Sales, and £130,943 at the October 2005 sales. He was also agreeing to bid on behalf of others both at the 2006 and 2007 St Leger Yearling Sales.
The 2007 St Leger Yearling Sales
45 DBS and Mr Jarvis agree that at the 2007 St Leger Yearling Sales Mr Jarvis’s bids for four horses totalling £43,275 were accepted because he was bidding as agent for Hibiscus Events Ltd (“Hibiscus”), to which the invoices were addressed. There is disagreement over whether Hibiscus was represented as a client of Mr Jarvis’s son-in-law, Mr Karl Burke: DBS says it was, and two of the ringside Acknowledgement of Purchase forms refer to Mr Burke. Mr Jarvis’s evidence in the end was that he had gone to the 2007 Sales separately on behalf of Mr Burke but, having looked at the horses Mr Burke had identified, chose not to bid on them; and that while he had talked to Mr Burke about Hibiscus, Mr Burke had no formal connection with it: Hibiscus was actually a company connected with one of his own owners, a Mr Colin Jones. Mr Jarvis said that an Authorisation of Agent form allowing him to bid for Hibiscus had been filed. As above, DBS says that on payment being demanded Hibiscus denied liability on the basis th